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Abstract-A problem of a Nash equilibrium point existence and calculating for a 3-person game on 
polyhedral sets with special payoff functions is considered. It is shown that its existence is equivalent 
to that of a saddle point in an auxiliary antagonistic game on polyhedral sets and that the saddle 
point calculating can be done using vector-solutions of a linear and quadratic programming problem 
formulated on the basis of the master 3-person game. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
An example of a S-person game on polyhedral sets where existence of a Nash equilibrium point 
is equivalent to that of a saddle point in an auxiliary antagonistic game was presented by the 
author in [l]. A method for calculating such a saddle point for that type of antagonistic game on 
polyhedral sets was proposed by the author in [2]. The method enables us to calculate a saddle 
point for the solvable antagonistic game using vector-solutions of two auxiliary problems: linear 
and quadratic, so that the vector-solutions turn out to be components of the saddle point. In 
this article, we consider one more 3-person game for which a Nash point calculating can be also 
reduced to that of a saddle point in an auxiliary antagonistic game on polyhedral sets. Necessary 
and sufficient conditions of a Nash equilibrium point in this game are proposed. Using these 
conditions, it becomes possible to reduce calculating of the Nash point to that of a saddle point 
in that very type of antagonistic game for which the method proposed in [2] can be used. 
2. THE PROBLEM STATEMENT AND 
MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
Let us consider the following problem which can serve as a model for some practical situations. 
A company (evacuator) must evacuate from a territory a finite number of some waste products 
(for example, radioactive or hazardous) at certain volumes of each according to the existing 
environmental protection regulations. Such an evacuation implies the necessity of finding a 
recipient agreed to accept such products in certain amounts and kinds being paid for that along 
with a carrier agreed to transport such a cargo. The evacuator must pay both the recipient and 
carrier and is interested in minimizing its total expenditure. Accordingly the recipient is trying 
to get as much as possible from the evacuator nominating the prices for each evacuated product 
within some reasonable limits. However, the recipient in his turn is charged for acceptance of such 
waste products, for example, by the local government, and at the same time, may usually have 
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an additional revenue charging the carrier for certain services in points of the products’ delivery 
(for example, ports, railroad stations, truck terminals, etc., located on the territory where the 
recipient agreed to accept the products). Some reasonable limits on tariffs are also applied, and 
the carrier can offer his services just in accordance with those limits trying in his turn to maximize 
his revenue. 
In practical situations, the evacuator is limited in spending the money for the evacuation 
services so participants of the considered situation can be examined as players in a 3-person 
game having certain strategies and payoff functions. It is of importance and interest (from 
practical and scientific view points) to know if such a game has an equilibrium point and how it 
could be calculated, if so. 
It was discussed and shown in [2] that, in many situations which are of interest for practice 
including the one described above, the sets of the players strategies are polyhedra determined 
by solvable systems of linear inequalities. Based on [2] and omitting secondary details, we shall 
further assume that the players allowable strategies are polyhedra M, 0, H described by the 
following systems of inequalities 
where A, B, G and b, d, g are matrices and vectors of corresponding dimensions.We further assume 
that x is vector of prices paid by the evacuator for products to be evacuated, y and u are, 
respectively, vectors of volumes and transportation tariffs for products to be evacuated. We also 
assume that elements of all the considering matrices and vectors are real numbers. 
So, we examine the 3-person game where the players are the evacuator, recipient and carrier 
with the following payoff functions: 
the carrier: fi(x, y, U) = max,en(y, u), which is to be maximized on H; 
the recipient: fs(x, y,~) = max,eM(y,x) + k . (y,~) - (q,y), which is to be maximized 
on 0; 
the evacuator: fa(x, y, U) = maxyEn max,eH {(y, U) + (y, x)}, which is to be minimized 
on M; 
and where H, R, and M are sets of the players allowable strategies correspondingly, 0 < Ic < 1. 
We further consider a generalization of such a game where the players have the following payoff 
functions1 : 
fl(x, y, u) = maxyEn {(y, U) + (y, Dx) + (p, x)}, which is to be maximized on H; 
f~(x, y, u) = max,eM {(y, U) + (y, Dx) + (q, y) + (p, x)}, which is to be maximized on s1; 
fs(z, y, U) = maxyEn max,eH {(y, U) + (y, Dx) + (p, x)}, which is to be minimized on M; 
and sets of their allowable strategies are H, R, M respectively. We shall assume that H, R, M 
are arbitrary (generally speaking) unbounded polyhedral sets given by joint systems of linear 
inequalities in nonnegative orthants of some spaces having finite dimensions and that (y, u) and 
(y, X) are bounded from above on H and M respectively Vy E R and p, q, D are, respectively, 
vectors and matrices of corresponding dimensions, the elements of which are real numbers. 
3. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS 
FOR A NASH EQUILIBRIUM POINT IN 
THE GENERALIZED 3-PERSON GAME 
Let 
(x*,y*,u*) E M x i2 x Hand 
u* E ArgFE$~*,u),~* E Argngy &Y, 4 + (ad + (Y, ox*) + (P, x*) . 
‘One can easily show that the initial J-person game is reducible to a game of such type. 
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THEOREM 1. (x*, y*, u*) is a Nash point in 3-person game on M x R x H with payoff functions _ _ - 
fi, f2, f3, if and only if (x*, y*) is a saddle point in an antagonistic game on M x R with payoff 
function rl(x, Y) = m=k4y, 4 + (a y) + (y, W + (P, 4. 
PROOF. Necessity follows from definitions of !I, &, fs, and obvious inequality 
FEy$Y7 4 + (CL Y) + (Y, Dx*) + (P, x8) I YE% 
{ 
$y$Y, u) + (q, Y) + (y, Dx*) + (p, 5*) 1 vy E s-2. 
Suficiency. Let (x*, y*) be a saddle point for r](x, y) on M x 0. Then maxUEH(y,u) + (q, y) 
+ (Y, Dx*) + (p,x*) I (y*,u*) + (4, y*) + (y*,Dx*) + (P,x*). nom (Y,u*) + (qLy) + (y,Dx*) 
+ (P, x*) 5 m=uH(y,u) + (q, y) + (Y, Dx*) + (p,x*)Vy E 0 conclude that fz(x*, y,u*) 5 
fz(x*, Y’, ~*)\JY E 0. Further, from (Y*, u*) + (4, y*) + (Y*, Dx*) + (p, x*) 5 (y*, u*) + (q, y*) 
+ (y*, Dx) + (p, x)Vx E M conclude that $3(x, y*, u*) > fz(x*, y*, u*)Vx E M. 
Let’s consider now fl (x*, y*, u) = (y*, u) + (y*, Dx*) + (p, x*) and notice that from 
n&Y?4 + (%Y) + (Y,Dx*) + @7x*) I (Y*,u*) + k&Y*) + (Y*,Dz*) + (P,5*), 
it follows that 
VY E fl, 
n&Y*‘4 + (%Y*) + (Y*, Dx*) + (P, 2’) 5 (Y*, u*) + (q,Y*) + (Y*, Dx’) + (24 x*), 
which means, in particular, that 
(Y*, 4 + (Y*, Dx*) + (PI x:*) L (Y*,u*) + (Y*, =*) + (P7 x*j, 
which is in its turn equal to $l(x*,y*,u) 5 fl(x*, y*,~*)Vu E H. 
Theorem 1 is proved. 
Vu E H, 
Then, there takes place the following obvious assertion. 
ASSERTION 1. (x*, y*) is a saddle point in an antagonistic game with payoff function 
$$Y, 4 + (41 Y) + (Y1 w + b-3 xc), 
if and only if (Z*, y*) is a saddle point in an antagonistic game with payoff function ms,xUEH (y, u) 
+ (Yyl m + (P, -3 x on a x Sz, where &f = M x {l},@ = (p,O),fi = [Dq],Z = (x, 1). 
Thus, it was shown that the master S-person game is reducible to an antagonistic game on 
polyhedral sets for which the theory and solution method were proposed in [2]. We formulate the 
corresponding results below in notations of the present article. Proofs of the theorems formulated 
below were done in [2]. 
Let 
ti= EEIR~+’ :A? > b , 
{ > 
A=[AO],Q={(~,y)>O:fAIB+y~,By~d}, 
P(u)={(t,E)~O:tB~--21--~,A~~b}. 
THEOREM 2. [2] In order for (?*, y*) to be the saddle point of function $(Z, y) = ms&&H(y, u) 
+ (y, D!E) + (p”, 5) on k x R, it is necessary and sufficient that points t* 2 0, u* 2 0, t’ 2 0, exist 
such that (Z*, y*, u*) and (t*, Z*, u*) are solutions, respectively to the problems 
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and the following equality is satisfied 
0, is zero vector in KP, V = (fi, 4, -g), g = (DZ*, 0,), r/?/ = 
E is the unit (n x n) matrix, < = (y,u), w = (4, -9). 
ASSERTION 2. [2] The solvability of problems (1) and (3) is equivalent to that of the respective 
(3) 
quadratic programming problems 
(4) 
(5) 
Furthermore, if CL* = (y*, IL*, Z*) is the solution to (4), (t*, S?*) is the solution to linear pro- 
gramming problem 
(-dyt) + ($79 + (t,&%&7 (6) 
and [* = (y*,~*) is the solution to (5), then (Z*, y*) is the saddle point of function $(Z, y) on 
ti x R. 
From Assertion 2, it follows that establishing the solvability of the 3-person game and searching 
for the Nash points in solvable games of this kind can be done using known, in particular, finite 
methods of solving corresponding mathematical programming problems [2]. 
ASSERTION 3. [2] The solvability of the problem 
is equivalent to that of the quadratic programming problem 
(207 A) - (5, WC) + ($7 3 + (x Emi_;Ekl 
3 4 
where 
4. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
1. The result presented in this article for the 3-person game should be considered as a step 
forward in widening of linear and quadratic programming possibilities to solve substantially 
nonlinear problems on polyhedral sets. 
2. It should be played up that the proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for the Nash 
point are verifiable ones, and such a verification involves a software based on that for linear 
and quadratic programming. It enables us to solve large scale problems of the kind which are 
considered of importance for practice. 
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2. 
REFERENCES 
A. Belenky, Game theory methods on transportation systems analysis problems, Presented at the ldth 
International Symposium on Mathematical Programming, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, August 5-9, 1991. 
A. Belenky, An Antagonistic Game on Polyhedral Sets, Automation and Remote Control 47 (6), 757-761, 
(1986). 
